DAGUR NIŠURLĘGINGAR EFTIR ÓLA KĮRASON

DAGUR NIŠURLĘGINGAR:  

Hlutar śr pistlinum:

Žaš var žyngra en tįrum tęki aš fylgjast meš śtsendingu ķ sjónvarpi frį Alžingi aš kvöldi 30. desember s.l. 

Viš žessa lokamešferš kom fram, žegar stjórnaržingmenn geršu grein fyrir atkvęšum sķnum, į hvaša röksemdum žeir segjast byggja žį įkvöršun aš samžykkja žessar klyfjar į heršar ķslensku žjóšinni. Ķ žeim skżringum stendur ekki steinn yfir steini.

Svo heyršist viš atkvęšagreišsluna sagt aš naušsynlegt vęri aš samžykkja žetta til žess aš mįlinu lyki! Žaš er meš ólķkindum aš nokkur mašur, hvaš žį alžingismašur, skuli lįta žetta śt śr sér. Veriš er aš samžykkja drįpsklyfjar į žjóšina sem munu leggjast į ókomnar kynslóšir. Hvernig getur žvķ mįli veriš lokiš?

Fyrst žjóšin fęr ekki aš njóta réttarins til mešferšar fyrir dómi hlżtur afstaša ķslenskra alžingismanna, sem samžykkja lagafrumvarp um žessa įbyrgš, aš byggjast į žeirri forsendu aš hin lagalega skylda til žess sé fyrir hendi. En er žaš svo? Ekki svo séš verši. Alveg er ljóst aš ekki er kvešiš į um slķka įbyrgš ķ lögum nr. 98/1999 um innistęšutryggingar og tryggingakerfi fyrir fjįrfesta. Žar er žvert į móti gert rįš fyrir aš slķk įbyrgš sé ekki fyrir hendi. Ekki er vitaš til žess aš ašrar žjóšir hafi gert athugasemdir į sķnum tķma um aš meš žessum lögum vęri ekki fullnęgt skuldbindingum Ķslands į hinu evrópska efnahagssvęši. Enginn hefur getaš bent į žau įkvęši ķ tilskipunum svęšisins sem kveša į um slķka įbyrgš. Ekki er heldur vitaš til žess aš lagareglur um sambęrilegt tryggingakerfi hjį öšrum žjóšum hafi gert rįš fyrir rķkisįbyrgš. Raunar ętla sumir aš slķk įkvęši hefšu talist brjóta gegn reglum um rķkisstyrki. Mįliš viršist žvķ ekki flókiš. Engin rķkisįbyrgš er til stašar samkvęmt žeim réttarheimildum sem um žetta geta gilt.

Getur žaš veriš aš žau stjórnmįlaöfl sem nś um stundir fara meš völd į Ķslandi hafi tališ naušsynlegt aš samžykkja žessi ódęmi ķ žvķ skyni aš halda žeim völdum eitthvaš įfram? Hver sem svörin eru viš žessum spurningum er eitt vķst: Hinn 30. desember 2009 er mesti nišurlęgingardagur ķ samtķmasögu ķslensku žjóšarinnar.

http://www.amx.is/pistlar/13038/

Óli Björn Kįrason er annar ritstjóra AMX. 

 

 

Pistill Óla endar

____________________________________________________________________________

Allar lķkur eru į aš nśverandi rķkisstjórn og stjórnarlišar hafi komiš nišurlęgjandi fjįrkśguninni Icesave yfir okkur akkśrat til aš halda völdum og til aš stęrri flokkurinn komist nś inn ķ Kśgunarbandalagiš.  Og fjöldi manns hefur sagt žaš oft.  Ęvarandi skömmin er og veršur nśverandi rķkisstjórnar og stjórnarliša.  ICESAVE-KOMMŚNISTA-STJÓRN eins og Įsbjörn Óttarsson Alžingismašur ešlilega kallar hina hęttulegu stjórn. 

Allur heimurinn er į móti okkur, viš erum ein, viš komumst ekki lengra, viš komumst ekki lengra, sögšu žau ķ sķfellu.  Viš veršum aš borga til aš samfélag žjóšanna (tślkist EU) virši okkur.  Viš veršum aš borga fjįrkśgun til aš halda ęru.  Viš veršum svo žaš komi ekki óvešur og frostavetur og ķsöld.  Viš veršum, viš žurfum, viš veršum aš borga skuld sem viš skuldum ekki svo Hrikalegi Flokkurinn komist inn i EU og hann og VG geti haldiš völdum. 

Nokkur lönd voru į móti okkur og ekki allur heimurinn.  Viš komumst vel lengra, žau ęttu aš hafa fariš fyrir löngu og śtskżrt fyrir heiminum aš engin rķkisįbyrgš vęri į Icesave og aš viš skuldum Icesave ekki neitt.  Standa ķ lappirnar eins og heišarlegir menn. 

Nei, žaš vildu žau ekki, žau vildu bara lśffa og lyppast nišur fyrir yfirgangi og halda völdum.  Stęrri stjórnarflokkurinn er svo hrikalegur aš ég vil ekki sverta sķšuna meš nafni hans.  VG hefur gjörsamlega svikiš ALLT.   Lķka žetta sem žeir kolfelldu ķ Alžingi daginn svarta, 30. desember sl. žegar Pétur Blöndal kom meš tillögu um žjóšaratkvęši um Icesave:

VG: Vill aš 15-20% žjóšarinnar geti knśiš fram žjóšaratkvęši
Vefslóš: http://www.amx.is/forsida/13045/  

Flokkar og valdasinnar vaša og valta fullkomlega yfir lżšręšiš ķ landinu.  Viš erum lżšveldi žó hęttulegir flokks-valdasinnar virši žaš ekki og viršist ekki einu sinni vita žaš.   Almśginn, alžżša, fólkiš, ętti aš rįša öllu.  Og nś skulum viš vona aš Ólafur R. Grķmsson, forseti lżšveldisins, virši lżšręšiš og okkur.  

 

Ekkert Ice-save.

Nei, nei, nei.  Viš neitum aš borga nišurlęgjandi fjįrkśgun og höldum ęru.  

http://indefence.is/

 


UPPLOGIN SKULD

Ķsland hefur oršiš fyrir įrįs, ķ einni įrįsarlotunni sem kennd er viš ICEsave, er žjóšin krafin um 100 milljónir ķ vexti į dag.  Žessi orš skrifar Ómar Geirsson:
http://omargeirsson.blog.is/blog/omargeirsson/entry/990042/

Ómar endurtekur žar orš Jślķusar Björnssonar um ešli efnahagsįrįsa į lönd.  Og ég hef sett upp megininntak žessara orša Jślķusar ķ spįssķunni til hęgri į sķšunni.  

100 milljónir alla daga skulum viš borga fyrir upplogna skuld.  Lygaskuld sem viš skuldum ekki.  Žór Saari Alžingismašur og hagfręšingur heldur žvķ fram aš žaš muni taka skatttekjur yfir 79 žśsund okkar Ķslendinga af 150 žśsund skattbęrum mönnum įrlega bara til aš borga okurvexti af upplognu skuldinni sem Lepparnir ętla aš rukka okkur um ķ sköttunum okkar.  Halló, žaš eru tekjuskattar yfir 50% skattbęrra manna landsins.  Og allt ķ vasa śtlendinga sem heimta aš viš borgum skuldir óreišumanna af žvķ žeir voru vķst lķka ķslenskir eša žannig og af žvķ gungurnar sem stżra landinu vilja ekki verja okkur.   Žó veit ég ekki meš Björgólf Thor Londonbśa . . . . . en žaš er vķst nżtt ķ Evrópu aš ķslenska rķkiš og ķslenska žjóšin įbyrgist skuldir allra óreišumanna sem hafa stigiš fęti ķ Keflavķk.    

Viš megum eyša kannski nęstu öldinni ķ aš borga platskuld sem viš skuldum ekki upp į kannski langt yfir 1000 milljarša (1000 000 000 000).   Ekki 1000 milljórnir (1000 000 000) eins og ég held aš ofbeldisfylkingin haldi.   En žeir vita ekki hvaš žeir gjöra.  Og guš einn veit hvort viš getum nokkuš borgaš 1 eyri ķ höfušstólnum fyrr en eftir kannski 90 - 100 įr.   En žangaš til munum viš alltaf verša aš borga okurvextina segja žręlahaldararnir.   Og viš vitum ekki einu sinni hvaš lygaskuldin er hį!  Halló, veit fólk ekki vanalega hvaš žaš skuldar???   Ekki ef žaš bżr į Ķslandi, eša hvaš???  Kannski erum viš aš verša efnahagsnżlenda Breta og Hollendinga eins og Įrni Johnsen heldur???   

Viš megum ekki hlķta dómi segja žręlahaldararnir.  Viš megum hins vegar kannski af žeirra nįš ręša viš žį seinna um dóminn sem viš vinnum.  Og Leppstjórninni finnst žaš höfšinglega gert fyrir okkur aumingjana sem erum įbyrg fyrir öllum skuldum óreišumanna af ķslenskum toga.  Og lķka śtlendinga sem lentu ķ Keflavķk.  Hverjum var mśtaš???   Hótaš lķflįti???   Žaš er žaš sem ég vil vita. 

 

 Ekkert Ice-save.

 http://indefence.is/

 

 


EFNAHAGSĮRĮSIN GEGN ĶSLANDI - ÓHEILINDI RĶKISSTJÓRNARINNAR

Lögleg rannsókn veršur aš fara fram į endalausum óheilindum nśverandi rķkisstjórnar og stjórnarflokkanna ķ Icesave-mįlinu.  Sżknt og heilagt koma fram nż gögn um óheilindi stjórnarinnar og sķšast nśna ķ dag um leynisamskipti viš Alžjóšagjaldeyrissjóšinn og leyniskjöl žegar žeim var lekiš į heimsvefinn.  Hverjum er mśtaš?  Hótaš lķflįti???  Hvatinn aš halda vinstri stjórn og komast inn ķ Evrópubandalagiš er žarna vitum viš.  Og skal žegnum landsins blęša fyrir žaš?  Gleymum ALDREI aš žau ętlušu fyrst aš pķna Icesave1 óséšu gegnum Alžingi.  Žau munu hafa af okkur fullveldiš verši žau ekki stöšvuš. 
 
Endurtekiš hafa žau fališ gögn og skjöl sem hefšu įtt aš vera opinber og Alžingi og žjóšin hefšu įtt aš vita um.  Rķkisstjórnin og stjórnarflokkarnir hafa logiš endurtekiš aš Alžingi og žjóšinni.  Ofbeldi hefur veriš beitt gegn stjórnarandstöšunni og bókstaflega öllum rįšum veriš beitt til aš pķna ķ gegn nišurlęgjandi og stórhęttulegu Icesave sem viš skuldum ekki.  Icesave sem getur valdiš okkur missi į fullveldi landsins, missi į frišhelgi aušlinda og rķkiseigna og ekki sķst tapi žeirra til śtlendinga eins og geršist ķ Argentķnu, Bolivķu, Panama og vķšar.  Einn stęrsti glępur nśverandi stjórnar er aš hlżša ķ einu og öllu helstefnu Alžjóšagjaldeyrissjóšsins, nokkurn veginn eins og Ómar Geirsson oršaši žaš.  
      
Ķ Argentķnu voru öll rķkisfyrirtęki einkavędd aš kröfu Alžjóšagjaldeyrissjóšsins.  Ķ Bolivķu fengu śtlendingar einkaleyfi fyrir öllu vatni og bann var lagt viš aš fólk safnaši regnvatni.  Landsmenn gįtu ekki lengur fengiš vatn nema dżrum dómum.  Ķ Panama var siglingaleišin ķ gegnum landiš einkavędd af śtlendingum og allur aršurinn fór śr landinu. 
 
Ekkert landanna hagnašist af aušlindum sķnum, allur aršur fór beint ķ vasa aušmanna og śr landi til śtlendinga.  Og žegnarnir lifšu viš óžolandi fįtękt og nišurlęgingu.  Svipaš mun kannski gerast į Ķslandi fari ekki AGS landstjórinn og Icesave-stjórnin frį völdum.  Verš į heitu vatni og rafmagni gęti hękkaš upp śr öllu valdi.  Fari sem horfir mun nśverandi stjórn valda okkur alvarlegri fįtękt til langframa og stórtjóni. 
 
Rķkisstjórnin žarf aš fara frį völdum.  Žau eru EKKI aš vinna fyrir landiš og žjóšina, heldur gegn okkur.  Ljóst er nś aš žau komust til valda meš földum skjölum og innantómum oršum.  Žau samskipti sem hafa veriš į milli AGS og ķsl. fjįrmįlarįšuneytisins og var lekiš ķ wikileaks.org eru óžolandi og sżna handrukkaraešli sjóšsins svart į hvķtu.  Og żta enn frekar undir žaš aš AGS žarf aš rannsaka og ķsl. stjórnin aš vķkja.  Stjórnarflokkarnir eru aš valda okkur stórskaša meš žvķ aš fylgja tryggilega skemmdarstefnu Alžjóšagjaldeyrissjóšsins.  Kannski vęri ekki śr vegi aš skipta um nafn į žeim sjóši og kalla hann Alžjóšaglępasjóšinn?  Og stjórnarflokkarnir hafa nišurlęgt okkur meš ótrślegum gunguskap gegn stęrri veldum.  Žau feta ķ fótspor leištoga landa sem hafa lagt lönd sķn nįnast ķ eyši.
 
 
EKKI GENGIŠ AŠ AUŠLINDUM ĶSLANDS SEGIR RUV-
 

Žaš mį segja aš sį möguleiki aš aušlindir gengju upp ķ skuldir žjóšarinnar, aš žjóšin sé į žvķ augnabliki komin ķ greišlsužrot. Žvķ hlżtur sį möguleiki um gjaldžrot žjóšarinnar aš svipta alla žingmenn möguleikanum aš samžykkja IceSave samninginn, aš öšrum kosti vęru žeir aš framkvęma landrįš. Hjįseta er af sömu rökum ekki gerleg heldur. 
 
 
 
EVA HEFUR LÖG AŠ MĘLA-

Eva Joly kvešur sér hljóšs į sišum dagblašanna . . .
Ķslendingar geta ekki borgaš IceSave hvaš svo sem žeir reyna meš nišurskurši og skattahękkunum.

Gunnar Skśli Įrmannsson:
http://skulablogg.blog.is/blog/skulablogg/entry/924109/

 
 
Ekkert Icesave.


ÖGMUNDUR, HAFNIŠ ICESAVE

HAFNIŠ ICESAVE KŚGUNINNI

Ögmundur, viš skuldum ekki Icesave.  Enginn, ekki fęrustu lagaprófessorar, hafa getaš vķsaš ķ nein lög sem gera ķslensku žjóšina og rķkissjóš Ķslands įbyrgan fyrir Icesave, ekkert frekar en bresku og hollensku rķkissjóšina og žjóširnar.   Bretar og Hollendingar fóru meš eftirlit bankans ķ žeirra löndum ekki sķšur en viš og eru jafnsekir fyrir mistökunum.  

Žaš er ekki ykkar aš velja hvort viš veršum pķnd inn ķ žręlasamning aš ólöglegri kröfu Evrópubandalagsins, Breta og Hollendinga.  Žaš er ekki ykkar, Breta eša Hollendinga aš rįša žvķ aš tekin séu af okkur žau sjįlfsögšu mannréttindi aš verja okkur fyrir dómi.  Siguršur Lķndal og fjöldi lögspekinga hefur neitaš lagalegri įbyrgš okkar fyrir Icesave.  Og sišferšileg skylda okkar er ENGU STĘRRI en Breta og Hollendinga sjįlfra og Evrópubandalagsins ķ heild sinni.    

Hafniš žessari naušung.  Haldi Bretar og Hollendingar sig hafa löglega kröfu į rķkissjóš munu žeir sękja okkur fyrir dómi.  Žaš vilja žeir žó ALLS EKKI vegna žess aš žeir vita aš Icesave krafan er ólögleg kśgun.  Viš fórum eftir EVRÓPULÖGUM.  EES lögum sem segja skżrum oršum aš EKKI MEGI gera rķkissjóši landa įbyrga fyrir innlįnstrygginum hafi yfirvöld framfylgt lögunum eins og viš geršum.  Žeir vilja aš viš gjöldum laga žeirra sem geršu ekki rįš fyrir allsherjar-bankahruni heils lands.  Žeir vita aš ef žeir geta ekki gert okkur sek ķ hugum fólks muni fólk gera įhlaup į alla banka ķ Evrópu.  Žeir vita aš EKKERT land getur stašiš undir allsherjar-bankahruni.   Žeir vita upp į sig sökina, enda bśnir aš endurskrifa lögin og ętla aftur į bak meš ólöglega kröfu į okkur.  Og aum ķslensk stjórnvöld vilja ekki hafna naušunginni.  Og Jóhanna Sig. hótar enn vetrarfrosti og öllu illu ef viš ekki borgum reikning sem viš skuldum ekki.  Glępur śt af fyrir sig.       

Hafniš žręlasamningi gegn litlum börnum og ófęddum börnum, foreldrum og gamalmennum žessa lands ef žiš ekki viljiš aš allir flżji.  Hafniš Icesave alfariš og hęttiš aš ręša žessa upplognu skuld ķ Alžingi.  Rukkiš ašalskuldara Icesave, Björgólf Thor Björgólfsson Londonbśa og haldiš okkur utan viš Icesave.  

Og svo ég noti gömul orš Steingrķms Još: Žaš eru gungur og druslur sem ekki standa ķ lappirnar gegn yfirgangi.  Ykkur hefur ekki veriš hótaš lķflįti og ykkur veršur žvķ ALDREI fyrirgefiš ef žiš ętliš aš hleypa óendanlegri naušunginni ķ gegn til aš Jóhanna og co. geti dregiš okkur nišurlęgš inn ķ Evrópubandalagiš til óvina okkar Breta og Hollendinga og til aš žiš getiš haldiš vinstri stjórn.  Žaš yrši ekki löng vinstri stjórn, Ögmundur.  Viš lįtum ekki fara svona meš okkur.
 

 

ES: Ég skrifaši žetta bréf ķ sķšu Ögmundar Jónassonar ķ dag, 29. nóv., 09.   Hann birti žaš 2. des.:

http://ogmundur.is/fra-lesendum/nr/4913/


AN OPEN LETTER: ICESAVE IS AN EXTORTION

ICESAVE: AN EXTORTION
 
ICESAVE IS AN EXTORTION AGAINST ICELAND BY THE EU, THE IMF, BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS
 
As a citizen of Iceland and a parent I am compelled to write to you all about the Icesave coercion and extortion by the EU, the IMF, the British and the Dutch governments and with the obvious underlying help of the Swedish government, against the Icelandic nation.  It is clear to most of us what is happening and we will NOT stand for it.  We will write all over the world if that is what it takes and so have many Icelanders and foreigners.  
 
ICESAVE, or ICE-SLAVE as it is commonly called in Iceland, is NOT the obligation of the public of Iceland.  Icesave is a PRIVATE debt of a PRIVATE BANKRUPT BANK.  The main owner was Björgólfur Thor Björgólfsson of London, England.  He was the biggest owner of Landsbanki (the Icesave bank) and so he is the main debtor of Icesave. 
NOT THE ICELANDIC PUBLIC. 
 
The Icelandic public does NOT owe Icesave.  The British and the Dutch governments and the EU are lying to the world about the Icesave issue.  They misuse their power with the IMF to force the Icelandic public to pay Icesave and it will destroy us.  Should the Icelandic government sign this illegal slave-contract, we will never finsih paying this horror.  Only the interest will bankrupt us and the balance will stay unpaid.  With Icesave it is the intention of the British and the Dutch to use us as a source of revenue.  It has clearly come out in the open and people over here have started writing about this and opposing it heavily.  The opposing political parties are outraged.  
 
Many people have fled the country and many more will flee if the slave-contract goes through the parliament.  We will NOT live in our country as slaves.  People call this ICE-SLAVE or another Versailles Contract multiplied.
 
Many economists, lawyers and others have opposed the legality of Icesave, both in Iceland and overseas.  Our most respected law professors claim there is NO LAW THAT OBLIGATES THE ICELANDIC NATION TO PAY ICESAVE.  
 
The Icesave bank (Landsbanki) operated undir EEA/EU laws and under the supervision of 3 countries: Britain, the Netherlands and Iceland.  NOT ONLY ICELAND.  The EEA or EU legal authorities never issued a legal complaint against the operation of Icesave.  The European law was faulty and rather than taking the responsibility for it, the EU looked for a scapegoat and Iceland was easy.  We did not write the law, we followed it.  Following is the law the Icesave bank operated under: 
 
From the EEA/EU directive 94/19/EC,

"Whereas this Directive may not result in the Member States' or their competent authorities' being made liable in respect of depositors if they have ensured that one or more schemes guaranteeing deposits or credit institutions themselves and ensuring the compensation or protection of depositors under the conditions prescribed in this Directive have been introduced and officially recognized." 
 
The Icelandic government fulfilled this EEA/EU law, even though the British and the Dutch governments say the opposite.  Nobody, not the EU, not the IMF, or anybody else, can come after the fact and demand we pay what we do not owe.  We WILL NOT be bullied.  We WILL NOT be humiliated any longer.  We WILL NOT be exploited by the EU, the IMF and those 2 old colonizing powers.  We will not be their new colony and pay for extortion.  I feel for the all the people who lost their money.  Yet we cannot pay what we do not owe.  
 
Only one political party here, the party of Jóhanna Siguršardóttir (prime minister) and Össur Skarphéšinsson (foreign minister) are very willing to do anything for the EU, their key and private issue.  And this has damaged our cause greatly against the external oppressive forces and isolated us.  Instead of speaking publicly for their own nation in the world, they yes-ed everything the EU demanded.  Totally against the will of the vast majority of the people and to our utter disgust and outrage.  Close to 90% of the nation is opposed to paying Icesave.  It appears that the 10% left must be the supporters of the corrupted political party.  A group of lawyers have filed a legal complaint against the politicians who intend to force illegal Icesave upon us. The people are collecting signatures in order to compell our President not to sign the horrenduous Icesave bill.
 
NOTE: Jóhanna and Össur“s political party is the only political party with EU on the agenda.  However, they only got 29% of the total votes and the majority of the Icelandic voters do NOT want to join the EU and have NO intention of doing so. So the EU, the Dutch and the U. K. parliaments need to STOP threatening our politicians by telling them we will not be allowed to join the EU if we do not pay ICESAVE.  At least 3 members (1 econmomist and 2 lawyers) of our parliament have reported threats of this nature.  And thank god we will not be allowed to join a uninon with the agressors: Britain and the Netherlands and a few other overpowering nations.  With the utmost regard for the other nations within the EU.      
 
If the British and the Dutch believe they have a legal claim, they should file one in a court of law.  But no, they will NOT have it.  They want to deny us our constitutional right to do so.  They absolutely DO NOT want this in front of a judge.  Do people not find that odd or suspicious???   No, they want to force the Icelandic government to sign a contract saying we will NOT follow a court judgementTHAT WE WILL NOT FOLLOW A COURT JUDGEMENET.  That if a court decides with us, we can TALK to them, our agressors, and DISCUSS the judgement with THEM.  This is a criminal coercion.
 
The IMF has gone all over the world for a very long time and exploited and destroyed countries.  They force countries into colossal debt in order to collect money for City Bank and other huge banks and LARGER AND STRONGER countries like Britain and the Netherlands.  The IMF does this KNOWING these countries can NEVER pay the colossal debt or extortion.  That is a part of the plan to bankrupt the countries they pretend to be helping.  To bankrupt the countries“ companies and the people.
 
They keep interest rates high for the wealthy and drain the economy, they demand intolerable cuts in education and health care,  they demand very high taxes.  Then when the slaves can no longer pay - just like the IMF knew they couldn“t - they come in and demand property very cheap: They privatize the countries“ banks, companies and natural resources.  They have started this process in Iceland and Latvia. 
 
The IMF did this in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Panama, India and many, many other countries in Africa, Asia and South-America.  Now many of these countries are so-called 3rd world countries: Destitude and poor after the colonial and IMF exploitation.  The IMF should be shut down.  Now the IMF is in the process of destroying Iceland and Latvia. 
We will NOT live in OUR country as slaves.  We will NOT pay the illegal ICESAVE.   
 
 
Andrew Hill: For you the war is over:
 
In Iceland, this plan is compared with the Versailles treaty, blamed for wrecking Germany's economy after the first world war. It's a crass parallel. Yes, the Icesave collapse was in part a consequence of a wider economic campaign organised by generals who had no idea what they were doing. True, Britain did then use bully-boy tactics against Iceland that it would never have used against a bigger partner such as, say, India (another country whose banks were offering lofty interest rates to UK savers at the same time):
 
 
Eva Joly: Gordon Brown is wrong, Britain played a part in Icelandic bank collapse:
 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/5961143/How-could-a-handful-of-men-in-Reykjavik-supervise-a-powerful-City-bank.html?state=target#postacomment&postingId=5968571

Joseph Stiglitz:
 
After watching the IMF at work during the 1997 East Asian economic crisis, Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2001 winner of Nobel Prize in economics, wrote in April 2000:
“I was chief economist at the World Bank from 1996 until last November, during the gravest global economic crisis in a half-century. I saw how the IMF, in tandem with the U.S. Treasury Department, responded. And I was appalled.”
“The IMF may not have become the bill collector of the G-7, but it clearly worked hard (though not always successfully) to make sure that the G-7 lenders got repaid.”
 
 Michael Hudson: Can Iceland and Latvia pay the foreign debts run up by a fairly narrow layer of their population? The European Union and International Monetary Fund have told them to replace private debts with public obligations, and to pay by raising taxes, slashing public spending and obliging citizens to deplete their savings:
 
Nathan Lewis: IMF destroys Iceland and Latvia; The IMF should be abolished:
 
 
 
ES: Žetta bréf var sent til alžjóšasamtaka og fjölda landsstjórna 19. - 27.  nóv., 09. 

AGS (IMF) EYŠILEGGUR ĶSLAND OG LETTLAND:

IMF inni į gafli mun eyšileggja okkur:

 

MICHAEL HUDSON:

IMF, ICELAND, LATVIA:
 
Can Iceland and Latvia pay the foreign debts run up by a fairly narrow layer of their population? The European Union and International Monetary Fund have told them to replace private debts with public obligations, and to pay by raising taxes, slashing public spending and obliging citizens to deplete their savings:


http://www.counterpunch.org/hudson08182009.html

 

MICHAEL HUDSON:


Why Iceland and Latvia Won't (and Can't) Pay for the Kleptocrats' Ripoffs

By MICHAEL HUDSON

In the wake of the world crash populations are asking not only whether debts should be paid, but whether they can be paid! If they can’t be, then trying to pay will only shrink economics further, preventing them from becoming viable. This is what has led past structural adjustment programs to fail.

For the past decade Iceland has been a kind of controlled experiment, an extreme test case of neoliberal free-market ideology. What has been tested has been whether there is a limit to how far a population can be pushed into debt-dependency. Is there a limit, a point at which government will draw a line against by taking on public responsibility for private debts beyond any reasonable capacity to pay without drastically slashing public spending on education, health care and other basic services?

The problem for the post-Soviet economies such as Latvia is that independence in 1991 did not bring the hoped-for Western living standards. Like Iceland, these countries remain dependent on imports for their consumer goods and capital equipment. Their trade deficits have been financed by the global property bubble – borrowing in foreign currency against property that was free of debt at the time of independence. Now these assets are fully “loaned up,” the bubble has burst and payback time has arrived. No more credit is flowing to the Baltics from Swedish banks, to Hungary from Austrian banks, or to Iceland from Britain and the Netherlands. Unemployment is rising and governments are slashing healthcare and education budgets. The resulting economic shrinkage is leaving large swaths of real estate with negative equity.

Can Iceland and Latvia pay the foreign debts run up by a fairly narrow layer of their population? The European Union and International Monetary Fund have told them to replace private debts with public obligations, and to pay by raising taxes, slashing public spending and obliging citizens to deplete their savings. Resentment is growing not only toward those who ran up these debts – Iceland’s bankrupt Kaupthing and Landsbanki with its Icesave accounts, and heavily debt-leveraged property owners and privatizers in the Baltics and Central Europe – but also toward the neoliberal foreign advisors and creditors who pressured these governments to sell off the banks and public infrastructure to insiders. Support in Iceland for joining the EU has fallen to just over a third of the population, while Latvia’s Harmony Center party, the first since independence to include a large segment of the Russian-speaking population, has gained a majority in Riga and is becoming the most popular national party. Popular protests in both countries have triggered rising political pressure to limit the debt burden to a reasonable ability to pay.

This political pressure came to a head over the weekend in Reykjavik’s Parliament. The Althing agreed a deal, expected to be formalized today, which would severely restrict payments to the UK and Netherlands in compensation for their cost in bailing out their domestic Icesave depositors.

This agreement is, so far as I am aware, the first since the 1920s to subordinate foreign debt to the country’s ability to pay. Iceland’s payments will be limited to 6 per cent of growth in gross domestic product as of 2008. If creditors take actions that stifle the Icelandic economy with austerity and if emigration continues at current rates to escape from the debt-ridden economy, there will be no growth and they will not get paid.

A similar problem was debated eighty years ago over Germany’s World War I reparations. But policy makers are still confused over the distinction between squeezing out a domestic fiscal surplus and the ability to pay foreign debts. No matter how much a government may tax its economy, there is a problem of turning the money into foreign currency. As John Maynard Keynes explained, unless debtor countries can export more, they must pay either by borrowing (German states and municipalities borrowed dollars in New York and cashed them in for domestic currency with the Reichsbank, which paid the dollars to the Allies) or by selling off domestic assets. Iceland has rejected these self-destructive policies.

There is a limit to how much foreign payment an economy can make. Higher domestic taxes do not mean that a government can turn this revenue into foreign exchange. This reality is reflected in Iceland’s insistence that payments on its Icesave debts, and related obligations stemming from the failed privatization of its banking system, be limited to some percentage (say, 3 percent) of growth in gross domestic product (GDP). There is assumption that part of this growth can be reflected in exports, but if that is not the case, Iceland is insisting on “conditionalities” of its own to take its actual balance-of-payments position into account.

The foreign debt issue goes far beyond Iceland itself. Throughout Europe, political parties advocating EU membership face a problem that the Maastricht convergence criterion for membership limits public debt to 60 percent of GDP. But Iceland’s external public-sector debt – excluding domestic debt – would jump to an estimated 240 percent of GDP if it agrees to UK and Dutch demands to reimburse their governments for the Icesave bailouts. Meanwhile, EU and IMF lending to the Baltics to support their foreign currency – so that mortgages can be kept current rather than defaulting – likewise threaten to derail the membership process that seemed on track just a short time ago.

Austerity programs were common in Third World countries from the 1970s to the 1990s, but European democracies have less tolerance for so destructive an acquiescence to foreign creditors for loans that were irresponsible at best, outright predatory at worst. Families are losing their homes and emigration is accelerating. This is not what neoliberals promised.

Populations are asking not only whether debts should be paid, but whether they can be paid! If they can’t be, then trying to pay will only shrink economics further, preventing them from becoming viable. This is what has led past structural adjustment programs to fail.

Will Britain and the Netherlands accept this new reality? Or will they cling to neoliberal – that is, pro-creditor – ideology and keep on stubbornly insisting that “a debt is a debt” and that is that. Trying to squeeze out more debt service than a country could pay requires an oppressive and extractive fiscal and financial regime, Keynes warned, which in turn would inspire a nationalistic political reaction to break free of creditor-nation demands. This is what happened in the 1920s when Germany’s economy was wrecked by imposing the rigid ideology of the sanctity of debt.

A similar dynamic is occurring from Iceland to the Baltics. The EU is telling Iceland that in order to join, it must pay Britain and Holland for last autumn’s Icesave debts. And in Latvia, the EU and IMF have told the government to borrow foreign currency to stabilize the exchange rate to help real estate debtors pay the foreign-currency mortgages taken out from Swedish and other banks to fuel its property bubble, raise taxes, and sharply cut back public spending on education, health care and other basic needs to “absorb” income. Higher taxes are to lower import demand and also domestic prices, as if this automatically will make output more competitive in export markets.

But neither Iceland nor Latvia produce much to export. The Baltic States have not put in place much production capacity since gaining independence in 1991. Iceland has fish, but many of its quota licenses have been pledged for loans bearing interest that absorbs much of the foreign exchange from the sale of code. Interest charges also absorb most of the revenue from its aluminum exports, geothermal and hydroelectric resources.

In such conditions a pragmatic economic principle is at work: Debts that can’t be paid, won’t be. What remains an open question is just how they won’t be paid. Will many be written off? Or will Iceland, Latvia and other debtors be plunged into austerity in an attempt to squeeze out an economic surplus to avoid default?

Failure to recognize the limited ability to pay runs the danger of driving over-indebted countries out of the Western orbit. Iceland’s population is upset at the EU’s backing of the bullying tactics of Britain and Holland trying to extract reimbursement for bailing out their Icesave depositors – €2.6 billion to Britain and €1.3 billion to Holland. Social Democrats won April’s Althing election on a platform of joining the EU, but burdening the country with these Icesave debts would prevent it from meeting the Maastricht criteria for joining the EU. This makes it appear as if Europe is more concerned with debt collection than with getting new members.

Of most serious concern are the long-term consequences of replacing defaults by debt pyramiders and outright kleptocrats with a new public debt to international government agencies – debt that is much less easy to write off. Eva Joly, the French prosecutor brought into sort out Iceland’s banking kleptocracy, warned earlier this month that if Iceland succumbs to current EU demands, “Just a few tens of thousands of retired fishermen will be left in Iceland, along with its natural resources and a key geostrategic position at the mercy of the highest bidder – Russia, for example, might well find it attractive.” The post-Soviet countries already are seeing voters shift away from Europe in reaction to the destructive policies the EU has been supporting.

Neither Britain nor Holland, neither the EU nor IMF have provided a scenario for just how Iceland is supposed to pay the debts that are being claimed. How much will personal income and living standards have to fall? What government programs must be cut back? How many defaults on domestic mortgages and personal debts will result, and how much unemployment? How much emigration will occur? The models being employed treat these dimensions of the economic problem as “externalities,” but they are central to how the economic system works in practice.

The question is whether neoliberal ideology will give way to economic reality, or whether economic policy will retain the blinders that typically characterize short-term creditor-oriented policies? What is blocking a more reasonable pro-growth policy, Ms. Joly observed, is that “the Swedish presidency of the EU does not seem to be in a hurry to improve regulation of the financial sectors, and the committees with an economic focus in the Parliament are, more than ever, dominated by liberals, particularly British liberals.” So Europe continues to impose a shortsighted economic ideology. Therefore, she concluded: “Mr. Brown is wrong when he says that he and his government have no responsibility in the matter. Firstly, Mr. Brown has a moral responsibility, having been one of the main proponents of this model which we can now see has gone up the spout. … Could anyone realistically think that a handful of people in Reykjavik could effectively control the activities of a bank in the heart of the City? … the European directives concerning financial conglomerates seem to suggest that EU member states that allow such establishments into their territories from third countries must ensure that they are subject to the same level of control by the authorities of the country of origin as that provided for by European legislation. … a failure on the part of the British authorities on this point … would not be particularly surprising considering the ‘performance’ of other English banks … during the financial crisis? If so, Mr. Brown’s activism in relation to this small country might be motivated by a wish to appear powerful in the eyes of his electorate and taxpayers …”

Some inconvenient financial truths and ideological blind spots

       Most deposit insurance settlements for insolvent institutions are merely technical in scope: how much are depositors insured for, and how soon will they get paid? But the Icesave problem is so large in magnitude that it raises more legally convoluted economy-wide questions. The Althing’s stance on Iceland’s foreign debt – and the abuses of its kleptocratic domestic bank privatizers – represents a quantum leap, a phase change in global debtor/creditor relations.

No doubt this is why creditors and neoliberals will fight Iceland’s brave show so vehemently, angrily, unfairly and extra-legally. For starters, Gordon Brown did not follow the proper agreed-upon legal procedures last October 6 when he closed down Landsbanki’s Icesave branches and the Kaupthing affiliates. Under normal conditions Iceland would have availed itself of the right under European law to pay out depositors in an orderly manner. But Mr. Brown prevented this by directing Britain’s deposit-insurance agency to pay Icesave depositors as if they were covered by UK insurance. It was a rash decision that could turn out to be one of the biggest blunders of his career. The Icesave branches were legally extensions of Landsbanki in Iceland, covered by Iceland’s deposit insurance scheme, not that of Britain.

Iceland’s Depositors’ and Investors’ Guarantee Fund (TIF) is privately funded by domestic banks, not public like America’s Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) or Britain’s Financial Services Agency (FSA). Reflecting Iceland’s neoliberal philosophy at the time the banks were privatized, the TIF lacked the capital to cover the losses that ensued. It was like America’s A.I.G. insurance conglomerate, whose premiums were set far too low to reflect the actual risk involved. The problem is typical of the neoliberal “rational market” idea that debts cannot create a problem, but merely reflect asset prices that in turn reflect prospective income.

In an environment that saw Northern Rock and the Royal Bank of Scotland fail, Iceland’s Commerce Ministry wrote to Clive Maxwell at Britain’s Treasury on October 5 to assure him that the government would stand behind the TIF in reimbursing Icesave depositors in accordance with EU directives. Yet three days later, Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling claimed that Iceland was refusing to pay. On this pretense Mr. Brown used emergency anti-terrorist laws enacted in 2001 to freeze Icelandic funds in Britain. He did so despite Iceland’s promise to abide by the EU rules. Icelandic authorities were given no voice in how to resolve the matter. Britain and the Netherlands (as they acknowledge in the proposed agreement with which they confronted Icelandic negotiators on June 5, 2009) merely “informed” Icelandic authorities, without following the rules and consulting with them to get permission for their quick bailout of depositors.

This affectsthe question of who is legally responsible for British and Dutch reimbursement of Icesave and Kaupthing depositors. The relevant EU law gives the responsible authorities a breathing space of three months to proceed with settlement – with a further six-month period where necessary. This would have enabled Iceland to collect from British bank clients such as the retail entrepreneur (and major Kaupthing stockholder) Kevin Stanford, who borrowed billions of euros, far in excess of what was proper under banking rules. It is now known that Icelandic banks in Britain were emptying out their deposits by making improper loans to British residents. But rather than helping Iceland move in a timely manner to recover deposits that Landsbanki and Kaupthing had lent out, Britain’s precipitous action plunged it into financial anarchy. The Serious Fraud team has started to help with the investigation and recovery process only in the past few weeks – now that the funds are long gone!

On November 4, ECOFIN, the EU’s financial oversight agency, held an informal ministerial meeting and “agreed, under very unusual circumstances,” to examine the financial crisis into which the Icebank and Kaupthing insolvencies had plunged the country. The EU proposed that the problem be resolved by five financial officials. But Iceland worried that such individuals tend to take a hard-line creditor-oriented position. Seeing how Britain and the Netherlands had acted on their own without regard for how their actions were hurting Iceland, Finance Minister Arni Mathiesen wisely wrote on November 7 to Christine Lagarde, President of the ECOFIN Council, that Iceland’s government would not participate in the review of Iceland’s obligations under Directive 94/19/EC.

The EU directive dealt only with the collapse of individual banks, assuming this problem to be merely marginal in scope and hence readily affordable by signatory governments. But “the amount involved could be up to 60 per cent of Iceland’s GDP,” Mr. Mathiesen explained. The directive left Iceland in legal limbo regarding “the exact scope of a State’s obligations … in a situation where there is a complete meltdown of the financial system.” The directive simply did not envision systemic collapse of a developed Western European economy. Such is the state of today’s mainstream equilibrium theory – an ideological argument that economies automatically stabilize and hence no government policy is needed, no public oversight or regulation.

It is a set of assumptions and junk economics that kleptocrats, crooks and neoliberals love, as it has enabled them to get very, very wealthy and then run to government claiming that a Katrina-like accident has occurred that requires them to be fully bailed out or the economy will collapse without their self-serving wealth-seeking services. This “rational market” mysticism is what now passes for economic science. And it is in the name of this junk science that EU financial officials and indeed, central bankers throughout the world are indoctrinated with blinders that do indeed enable them to find every collapse of their theories “unanticipated.”

The question that needed to be confronted head-on was how to take account of Iceland’s “very unusual circumstances” stemming from its unwarranted faith in neoliberal theory that assumed finance and the debt overhead would never pose a structural problem, but would only serve to facilitate economic growth. At issue was the “sanctity of debt” ideology that took no account of the broad economic context and growth prospects. “Iceland has to make sure that its deposit-guarantee scheme has adequate means and is in a position to indemnify depositors,” the Finance Minister wrote. The problem was macroeconomic in character, but the bank insurance scheme was only for 1 per cent of deposits – under conditions where the country’s main three banks all were driven under by the combination of bad or outright kleptocratic management and Britain’s freezing of Icelandic funds in the aftermath of the Icesave collapse. On November 25 an IMF team calculated that “A further depreciation of the exchange rate of 30 per cent would cause a further precipitous rise in the debt ratio (to 240 percent of GDP in 2009) and would clearly be unsustainable.”

Gordon Brown has spent much of 2009 trying to pressure the IMF to collect for Kaupthing’s insolvency as well as that of Landesbanki’s Icesave accounts. In Parliament on May 6 he announced his intention to ask the IMF to pressure Iceland to reimburse depositors in Kaupthing affiliates. He was reminded that unlike the Icesave branches, these were incorporated as British entities, making their accounts the responsibility of British regulation and deposit insurance. What was improper was his crass treatment of the IMF as a debt collector for the creditor nations, using it as a supra-legal lever to pressure Iceland to pay money that its negotiators felt they did not owe under EU rules. This was the position even of the neoliberal former Prime Minister and Governor of the Central Bank, Mr. Oddson himself.

Why bring such pressure to bear if the obligation is clearly specified in the contract? It looked like Mr. Brown wanted to avoid blame by paying British bank depositors and assuring them that foreigners would pay. He proved to be incorrigible, pressuring the EU to tell Iceland that it could not negotiate to join until it settled “its” Icesave debt to Britain. And the Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister Maxime Verhagen was equally explicit on July 21. In an official statement he warned his Icelandic counterpart that it was “absolutely necessary” for Iceland to approve the compensation deal agreed for people who lost savings when internet bank Icesave went bankrupt. deal. “A solution to the problems round Icesave could lead to the speedy handling of Iceland’s request to join the European Union,” the minister hinted. “It could show that Iceland takes EU guidelines seriously.” What it showed, of course, was that the EU was letting Britain and the Dutch use extortionate threats to veto membership if they did not get what they wanted: the nearly €4 billion in bailout reimbursement plus interest at 5.5%.

It would be hard to imagine what could have been more effective in deterring Icelandic desire for membership in the EU. On July 23 the Law Faculty at the University of Iceland discussed the details and criticized the confidential agreement – without even having access to it. Britain and the Netherlands insisted that the terms and details of the agreement not be published, on pain of the leakers facing prosecution. But apparently through a secretarial error it appeared on the Internet on July 27! The result was an explosion of anger, not only at Britain and the Dutch but at its own financial negotiators for not simply walking out when the authoritarian terms were dictated at political and financial gunpoint.

The flames were fanned further on July 31 when Wikileaks published a Kaupthing report from September 25, 2008, detailing the loans to insiders that had helped drive the bank into insolvency. Major stockholders had borrowed against their bank stock to bid it up in price and give the appearance of prosperity and solvency. (Evidently deciding that the time had come to take the money and run, the bank owners emptied out the coffers by making loans to themselves. This signaled the death knell for any further fantasies about “efficient markets” in today’s neoliberalized jungle of financial deregulation.

Despite the fact that Kaupthing had been nationalized by Iceland’s government, it sued to block Iceland’s national TV network from broadcasting the details. This backfired, being the equivalent of getting a book banned in Boston – every publisher’s publicity dream! The imbroglio got the entire nation fascinated, prompting so many Icelanders to go on-line to read the document that the gag order was lifted on August 4. The response was a shocked fury at the crooked behavior whose backwash threatened to engulf the nation in a bad foreign debt deal.

On August 1, Eva Joly, who had been hired as a federal prosecutor a half-year earlier, published her article in Le Monde that appeared in many other countries, criticizing Britain’s behavior. But most disturbing of all was publication of the hard-line draft agreement that British and Dutch negotiators had handed to Iceland’s finance minister on June 5, 2009. It failed utterly to reflect the caveats that Icelandic negotiators had insist on the previous November. Bolstered by Gordon Brown’s shrill rhetoric and Britain’s insistence that the terms be kept secret, the EU’s harsh take-it-or-leave-it stance created an atmosphere in which the Althing had little choice but to draw a line and insist that any Icesave settlement had to reflect Iceland’s reasonable ability to pay. Icesave was caricatured as “Iceslave” signifying the debt peonage with which Iceland was threatened. The finance minister (a former Communist leader) seemed out of his depth in having knuckled under in the face of pressure to capitulate to unyielding British negotiators.

Why Iceland's move is so important for international financial restructuring
      
Iceland has decided that it was wrong to turn over its banking to a few domestic oligarchs without any real oversight or regulation, on the by-now discredited assumption that their self-dealing somehow will benefit the economy.

The amount of debt that can be paid is limited by the size of the economic surplus – corporate profits and personal income for the private sector, and the net fiscal revenue paid to the tax collector for the public sector. But for the past generation neither financial theory nor global practice has recognized any capacity-to-pay constraint. So debt service has been permitted to eat into capital formation and reduce living standards.

As an alternative is to such financial lawlessness, the Althing asserts the principle of sovereign debt at the outset in responding to British and Dutch demands for Iceland’s government to guarantee payment of the Icesave bailout:

The preconditions for the extension of government guarantee according to this Act are:

1. That … account shall be taken of the difficult and unprecedented circumstances with which Iceland is faced with and the necessity of deciding on measures which enable it to reconstruct its financial and economic system. This implies among other things that the contracting parties will agree to a reasoned and objective request by Iceland for a review of the agreements in accordance with their provisions.

2. That Iceland’s position as a sovereign state precludes legal process against its assets which are necessary for it to discharge in an acceptable manner its functions as a sovereign state.

Instead of imposing the kind of austerity programs that devastated Third World countries from the 1970s to the 1990s and led them to avoid the IMF like a plague, the Althing is changing the rules of the financial system. It is subordinating Iceland’s reimbursement of Britain and Holland to the ability of Iceland’s economy to pay.

        
This weekend’s pushback is a quantum leap that promises (or to creditors, threatens) to change the world’s financial environment. For the first time since the 1920s the capacity-to-pay principle is being made the explicit legal basis for international debt service. The amount to be paid is to be limited to a specific proportion of the growth in Iceland’s GDP (on the assumption that this can indeed be converted into export earnings). After Iceland recovers, the payment that the Treasury guarantees for Britain for the period 2017-2023 will be limited to no more than 4 per cent of the growth of GDP since 2008, plus another 2 per cent for the Dutch. If there is no growth in GDP, there will be no debt service. This means that if creditors take punitive actions whose effect is to strangle Iceland’s economy, they won’t get paid.

Iceland promises to be merely the first sovereign nation to lead the pendulum swing away from an ostensibly “real economy” ideology of free markets to an awareness that in practice, this rhetoric turns out to be a junk economics favorable to banks and global creditors.

As far as I am aware, this agreement is the first since the Young Plan for Germany’s reparations debt to subordinate international debt obligations to the capacity-to-pay principle.

No doubt the post-Soviet countries are watching, along with Latin American, African and other sovereign debtors whose growth has been stunted by the predatory austerity programs that IMF, World Bank and EU neoliberals imposed in recent decades. The post-Bretton Woods era is over. We should all celebrate.

Michael  Hudson is Distinguished Prof. of Economics at UMKC. In 2006 he was Prof. of Economics and Director of Economic Research at the Riga Graduate School of Law in Latvia. His website is michael-hudson.com.

 

NATHAN LEWIS:

IMF, ICELAND, LATVIA:

This is the trick: replacing private debts with public obligations. Lots of people loaned money to banks and corporations in Iceland. They are now facing huge losses.


What is supposed to happen here is: they take their losses. There was no government guarantee. Why should someone with no relation to this business deal have to pay off their losses just because they happen to live in Iceland?

The government of Iceland may not actually have the money to pay this off. They would have to borrow it. When the IMF makes a "rescue loan" to a government, the money spends no time in Iceland or Latvia. It goes directly to the foreign creditors, in places like New York and London.

However, the debts remain, to be paid off by the taxpayers of Iceland. Taxes rise, which just makes a bad economic situation worse. Valuable and important services are cut -- precisely when they are most needed. Then, the IMF "advisors" come in and start to make a lot of demands.

For example, they may demand that the government sell off "public infrastructure" and the assets of failed banks (which still have considerable value) to pay off the loans which were used to bail out the bankers in New York and London. Who buys this "public infrastructure"?

Typically, it's the bankers in New York and London! Normally, at very good prices -- very, very good prices. Extraordinarily good prices.

Prices for assets in a crisis are normally very low.  But, a government that can be coerced into bailing out the bankers can also usually be coerced into selling off state assets at values that no private owner would accept.

 

NATHAN LEWIS:

The IMF destroys Iceland and Latvia:

The International Monetary Fund operates primarily as a banker bailout machine. They cajole and tempt and confuse and threaten the leaders of governments worldwide to pay off the failed bets of the big bankers using the taxpayer funds of their countries. This has been going on a long time, at least since the early 1980s.

Thus, I am not in the teeniest bit surprised that the same thing is happening today in Iceland and Latvia.

This article by Michael Hudson has some of the details:

For the past decade Iceland has been a kind of controlled experiment, an extreme test case of neoliberal free-market ideology. ... Is there a limit, a point at which government will draw a line against taking on public responsibility for private debts beyond any reasonable capacity to pay without drastically slashing public spending on education, health care and other basic services? ...


The European Union and International Monetary Fund have told them to replace private debts with public obligations, and to pay by raising taxes, slashing public spending and obliging citizens to deplete their savings. Resentment is growing not only toward those who ran up these debts -- Iceland's bankrupt Kaupthing and Landsbanki with its Icesave accounts, and heavily debt-leveraged property owners and privatizers in the Baltics and Central Europe -- but also toward the neoliberal foreign advisors and creditors who pressured these governments to sell off the banks and public infrastructure to insiders.


This is the trick: replacing private debts with public obligations. Lots of people loaned money to banks and corporations in Iceland. They are now facing huge losses.


What is supposed to happen here is: they take their losses. There was no government guarantee. Why should someone with no relation to this business deal have to pay off their losses just because they happen to live in Iceland?

The government of Iceland may not actually have the money to pay this off. They would have to borrow it. When the IMF makes a "rescue loan" to a government, the money spends no time in Iceland or Latvia. It goes directly to the foreign creditors, in places like New York and London.

However, the debts remain, to be paid off by the taxpayers of Iceland. Taxes rise, which just makes a bad economic situation worse. Valuable and important services are cut -- precisely when they are most needed. Then, the IMF "advisors" come in and start to make a lot of demands.

For example, they may demand that the government sell off "public infrastructure" and the assets of failed banks (which still have considerable value) to pay off the loans which were used to bail out the bankers in New York and London. Who buys this "public infrastructure"?

Typically, it's the bankers in New York and London! Normally, at very good prices -- very, very good prices. Extraordinarily good prices.

Prices for assets in a crisis are normally very low. But, a government that can be coerced into bailing out the bankers can also usually be coerced into selling off state assets at values that no private owner would accept.

Hudson calls this "neoliberal free-market ideology." Of course, it has nothing to do with the principles of capitalism. You could call it a form of fascist imperialism. I think John Perkins, author of Confessions of an Economic Hit Man and The History of the American Empire, would agree with this terminology.

It is hard to tempt and cajole and confuse world leaders when you use unpleasant terms like "fascist imperialism." That's why these proposals are camouflaged with labels like "neoliberal free-market principles," when they have nothing to do with free-market principles.

It's not about "conservative" and "liberal." It's about us against the banker imperialists.

The IMF should be abolished.


 

Confessions of an economic hitman, John Perkins:

 

1 OF 3:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yTbdnNgqfs8  +

 
 

Joseph E. Stiglitz:

After watching the IMF at work during the 1997 East Asian economic crisis, Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2001 winner of Nobel Prize in economics, wrote in April 2000:
“I was chief economist at the World Bank from 1996 until last November, during the gravest global economic crisis in a half-century. I saw how the IMF, in tandem with the U.S. Treasury Department, responded. And I was appalled.”
“The IMF may not have become the bill collector of the G-7, but it clearly worked hard (though not always successfully) to make sure that the G-7 lenders got repaid.”



AGS (IMF) inni į gafli mun eyšileggja okkur:
 

Michael Hudson segir žarna svart į hvķtu aš bęši AGS (IMF) og EU krefjist žess aš rķkiš gangist ķ įbyrgš fyrir einka-skuld og "skuldin" skuli borguš meš nišurskurši og skattahękkunum. 

En žeir passa sig aš segja okkur ekki nśna aš seinna žegar allt er gjörsamlega komiš ķ žrot, muni žeir lķka heimta land og sjó og rķkisfyrirtęki. 

AGS (IMF) er eyšileggingarvald.  IMF hefur veriš aš aršręna žjóšir og eyšileggja lönd sķšan um mišja sķšustu öld.  Žeir eru óforskammašir handrukkarar aušvalds heimsins.  Žeir vinna svona: Fyrst gera žeir samning viš yfirvöld lands um stórt lįn.  Lįniš stoppar hinsvegar ekkert ķ landinu.  Žaš  fer beint śt śr landinu og er ętlaš aušvaldi og stórveldum heimsins, sem žeir eru hluti af og handrukka fyrir. 

Žeir halda stżrivöxtum hįum og öfugt viš hvaš žróuš lönd gera ķ efnahagslęgš.  Žeir krefjast ósvķfins nišurskuršar og óvišrįšanlegra skattahękkana og aftur skattahękkana.  Og aftur nišurskuršar.  Og aftur skattahękkana.   Nišurskuršurinn, skattahękkanirnar og stżrivextirnir valda almenningi og fyrirtękjum ólżsanlegum erfišleikum og óbętanlegu tjóni.  Endalaus fjöldi fyrirtękja landsins mun fara ķ žrot ef viš losum okkur ekki viš IMF.  

Og loks žegar viš getum ekki lengur borgaš fjįrkśgunina, sem var akkśrat plan žeirra, koma žeir inn og krefjast rķkisfyrirtękja okkar upp ķ, ódżrt.  Og nį lķka öllum fyrirtękjunum sem fóru į hausinn og rķkiš tók yfir, ódżrt.  Ódżrt fyrir aušvald stórveldanna sem žeir rukka fyrir.  Og allt veršur einkavętt eins og ķ Argentķnu, Panama og vķšar.   Og allt sem viš munum hafa eftir landstjórn žeirra og "hjįlp" mun verša himinhįir skattar, himinhįar skuldir, stórskaši og tap.  Meš öšrum oršum: Eymd, fįtękt og volęši. 

IMF er ógnarvald sem viš veršum aš losa okkur viš.  John Perkins segir aš ķ löndum žar sem alžżša stendur fast gegn žeim, takist žeim aš vinna minnstan skaša.  Lönd verša verst śti af völdum žessara mafķósa, žar sem almenningur er grunlaus um gjöreyšingarvald žeirra.

IMF hefur eyšilagt fjölda landa: Argentķnu, Bólivķu, Brasilķu, Chile, Colombķu, Equador, Indland, Lettland, Panama, Perś, Saudi-Arabķu og lķklega Guatamala, Ķrak, Ķran, Kosovo, Venezśela og önnur lönd.     

Og ekki aš undra: Bretland og Holland eiga stóran hlut ķ IMF:
http://www.imf.org/external/country/gbr/index.htm  
Og nśna ętla žeir ofrķkismenn aš beita valdi sķnu innan IMF og fjįrkśga ķslenska rķkiš og skattborgara fyrir Icesave-glępagengi.  Fjįrkśga foreldra og gamalmenni, aršręna börnin okkar og stórskaša landiš. 

Viš veršum aš losa okkur viš žessi kśgunarsamtök. Lķka hef ég heyrt IMF kallaš glępasamtök.  Žaš er gališ aš hafa AGS yfir okkur og gališ aš gangast undir Icesave-naušung.  Icesave er ekki okkar skuld, hvorki lagalega né öšruvķsi:

 

From the EEA/EU directive 94/19/EC,

"Whereas this Directive may
not result in the Member States' or their competent authorities' being made liable in respect of depositors if they have ensured that one or more schemes guaranteeing deposits or credit institutions themselves and ensuring the compensation or protection of depositors under the conditions prescribed in this Directive have been introduced and officially recognized."

And
:

"The system must
not consist of a guarantee granted to a credit institution by a member state itself or by any of its local or regional authorities."

 

 

Jón Danķelsson, hagfręšingur segir žaš merki um lélega stjórnmįlamenn aš hafa žurft aš leita į nįšir Alžjóšagjaldeyrissjóšsins
 
 
 
 


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